Cve 2026 24061 Telnetd Auth Bypass

Telnetd Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-24061)

Telnetd Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-24061)

CVE-2026-24061

GNU InetUtils telnetd Authentication Bypass Vulnerability

January 24, 2026 | Security Advisory

Summary

A critical authentication bypass vulnerability has been identified in GNU InetUtils telnetd. This vulnerability allows unauthenticated remote attackers to gain privileged access to affected systems. Organizations running telnetd are advised to apply patches or implement mitigations immediately.

Status: Active exploitation has been observed in the wild. Immediate action is recommended.

Vulnerability Details

Field Value
CVE ID CVE-2026-24061
CVSS Score 9.8 (Critical)
CWE CWE-88 (Argument Injection)
Attack Vector Network
Privileges Required None
Affected Versions GNU InetUtils 1.9.3 through 2.7
Fixed Version GNU InetUtils 2.8

How It Works

The vulnerability exists due to insufficient input validation in the telnetd service. The USER environment variable received during the Telnet NEW-ENVIRON option negotiation is passed directly to the /bin/login process without sanitization.

An attacker can supply a specially crafted username value that includes command-line flags. These flags are interpreted by the login process, allowing the attacker to bypass authentication and gain unauthorized access.

Impact: Successful exploitation results in unauthenticated remote access with root privileges.

Technical Details

The vulnerability exists in the get_user_name() function within telnetd/utility.c. This function retrieves the USER environment variable and returns it to the caller without validation.

Vulnerable Code Analysis

Vulnerable Code (telnetd/utility.c)
char *
get_user_name (void)
{
return getenv ("USER") ? xstrdup (getenv ("USER")) : xstrdup ("");
}
Patched Code (GNU InetUtils 2.8+)
char *
get_user_name (void)
{
char *u = getenv ("USER");
return (u && *u != '-') ? xstrdup (u) : xstrdup ("");
}

The vulnerable code passes user-controlled input directly to /bin/login via execl(). When the USER variable contains -f root, the login process interprets -f as a flag to skip authentication.

/* How telnetd invokes login */
execl("/bin/login", "login", "-h", host, "-p", user, NULL);
/* With malicious USER value, becomes: */
execl("/bin/login", "login", "-h", host, "-p", "-f", "root", NULL);

Proof of Concept

The following command demonstrates the vulnerability. This is provided for defensive validation purposes.

env USER='-f root' telnet -a <target_ip> 23
Disclaimer: Only test against systems you own or have explicit authorization to test. Unauthorized access is a criminal offense.

Detection Indicators

Security teams should monitor for the following indicators:

Indicator Description
Network Telnet NEW-ENVIRON option containing USER with -f flag
Auth Logs Login entries with usernames starting with -
Process /bin/login invoked with -f flag from telnetd

Log Analysis Commands

# Check auth logs for suspicious login attempts
grep -E "login.*-f" /var/log/auth.log
# Check for USER environment variable abuse
grep -E "USER=.*-f" /var/log/syslog

Affected Systems

Systems are affected if they meet the following criteria:

  • Running GNU InetUtils versions 1.9.3 through 2.7
  • The telnetd service is enabled and accessible
  • Port 23 is exposed to untrusted networks

Linux distributions that package GNU InetUtils telnetd may be affected. Consult your distribution's security advisories for specific guidance.

Recommended Actions

Remediation Steps

Upgrade to GNU InetUtils 2.8 or apply vendor patches
Disable telnetd service if not required
Block inbound connections to port 23 at the network perimeter
Review authentication logs for anomalous activity
Consider migrating to SSH for remote administration
Clarification: The recommendation to migrate to SSH applies to the telnetd service used for remote administration. For network diagnostics (port connectivity, protocol debugging), consider using netcat (nc) as a lightweight alternative to the telnet client.

References